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1 Introduction
Behavioral research in investor behavior has made huge progress over the last years. This
new evidence is summarized in several recent survey articles (see, e.g., Polkovnichenko
(2010) or Zhu (2010)). Latest studies have, for example, shown that IQ (Grinblatt et al.
(2011)), cognitive abilities (Christelis et al. (2010)), sensation seeking (Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2009)), religion (Kumar et al. (2011)), genes (Barnea et al. (2010)), nancial
literacy (van Rooij et al. (2011)), political preferences (Kaustia and Torstila (2011)) and
many other variables aect investor behavior.
While all these studies tremendously contribute to the progress which was made in un-
derstanding investor behavior, several important points remain open, however. Important
questions arise which have to be addressed to further enhance our understanding of the
behavior and performance of investors. How are all the above mentioned variables (or a
subset of them) related? Note, that the above selection of variables is far from complete
and that the above studies usually do not control for the long list of other variables shown
to be correlated with investor behavior in the real world. And, even more crucial, what
is the precise mechanism of how investor characteristics translate into investor behavior
and resulting investor performance? The last question is especially important for theoret-
ical nance. How should better descriptive theories look like? Which variables should be
included in models? Answers to the above raised points are also important for banks that
aim at improving nancial products or investment advice oered to customers. Further-
more, regulators and politicians all around the world currently pursue activities which
are designed to increase investor protection on the one hand or to enhance the level of
nancial literacy on the other hand without knowing which is the better way to help in-
vestors. Are attempts to increase nancial literacy hopeless as genes are the main drivers
of behavior?
In any case, the next steps of individual investor research should try to shed some light
on how important variables are related precisely and, even more important, should more
extensively analyze the mechanism or channel of how investor characteristics aect be-
havior and performance. Our paper is designed to tackle these points and thereby tries
to push our knowledge of investor behavior one step further in this direction.
2
Our goal is to suggest one specic experimental design which is useful to address the above
raised questions to \open the black box of investor behavior". The natural starting point
of any analysis of investor behavior is to focus on portfolio choice. As our goal is to suggest
a relevant and realistic but at the same time simple and parsimonious experimental design
we focus on a simple allocation decision between two risky assets (i.e., two dierent stocks
in our case) and a risk free asset. We do not claim that the precise situation analyzed which
will be described in detail below is the most relevant decision situation investors have to
deal with. Nor do we attempt and nor are we able to measure all variables on the long list of
factors unearthed by researchers which are shown to be correlated with investor behavior.
In order to circumvent the problem of potential omitted variables mainly associated with
the usage of eld data, we explicitly rely on an experimental set-up. The aim of our paper
is to analyze one important and realistic aspect of investor behavior based on a \real
problem" typically faced by investors which is also covered (at least in parts) in many
empirical, experimental, and theoretical scientic articles. To sum up, our paper presents
a way of how the above mentioned questions could be addressed in principal, thereby
providing guidance for future research on how to design such a study.
More specically, participants in our experiment observe charts of pairs of stocks which
will be the basis for the above mentioned portfolio choice problem later on. For each pair
of stocks, participants were told that the two stocks were in the same industry and that
the return on each stock reected common market shocks and common industry shocks,
as well as idiosyncratic shocks. For each pair of stocks (G and H), participants were shown
the price path of stock G for the whole year. For stock H, participants were shown the
price path for the rst half of the year only. Participants were asked to forecast the price
of H at the end of the year. To do so they could use the path of G during the entire year
as a signal which is a helpful but imperfect signal. In other words: Subjects know what is
going to happen in the future for sure. While this design might look quite unrealistic at
rst sight it is (designed to be) similar to what is happening when one rm in a specic
industry announces earnings. This earnings announcement might also be relevant to judge
the current state of other rms in the same industry which have not yet made an earnings
announcement. Precisely this situation is studied by Thomas and Zhang (2008) using data
from the eld. They study market reactions to earnings announcements. They consider
pairs of stocks in the same industry for which earnings announcements occur sequentially.
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Suppose earnings are announced rst for stock G, and then, some time later, for H. Since
G and H are in the same industry, the rst announcement is relevant for the second
stock. Consistently with this view, Thomas and Zhang (2008) nd that the price of stock
H reacts to the announcement for stock G. But, if investors were rational this reaction
should be on average correct. In contradiction with this hypothesis, Thomas and Zhang
(2008) nd that positive stock H reactions are followed by price declines when earnings
are announced for H. And negative reactions tend to be followed by price increases.
More generally, observing information or price developments for one nancial time series
while, at the same time, not knowing the development of other nancial time series is
precisely what happens to many (most?) investors every day. Investors usually observe
daily market returns as they are, for example, extensively covered in the evening news. At
the same time, they do not know the returns of individual stocks in their own portfolio,
for example (Glaser and Weber (2007b)). One reason might be that investors simply do
not track performance of their stock portfolio every day. In contrast, market returns are
quite salient. Note, that this situation resembles our design but diers in the sense that
actually realized charts of some times series are known to investors instead of \future
realized charts". However, the underlying economic situation is similar and, at the same
time, it is a real situation investors often face. Recent evidence underlines the relevance
of this second interpretation of our design. Several studies document that market returns
typically have stronger eects on market wide trading volume of individual stocks or
trading volume of individual investors when compared to the respective more intuitive
driver of volume: past returns of individual stocks in the case of individual stock trading
volume (see Statman et al. (2006)) and past realized portfolio performance in the case
of portfolio trading volume of individual investors (see Glaser and Weber (2009)). This
more general example shows how relevant the situation analyzed in our paper actually is.
After making the above described predictions for stocks subjects were asked to form
portfolios. The specic design of our study makes it possible to precisely measure impor-
tant and often analyzed aspects of investor behavior such as overreaction, overcondence,
portfolio choice, and resulting portfolio performance within one setting, thereby making
it possible to uncover some aspects of the black box of investor behavior and to docu-
ment one channel of how biases translate into investor performance. Portfolio eciency is
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thereby measured by the Sharpe ratio, a concept which is explained and extensively cov-
ered in almost every introductory nance textbook. Typically, studies present a correlation
between, for example, overcondence on the one hand and behavior or performance on
the other hand. We identify the precise channel (overreaction) which is proposed by some
models. We nd that subjects overreact, i.e. forecasts are too optimistic after positive sig-
nals and too pessimistic after negative signals. Furthermore, there is greater overreaction
when subjects are more overcondent. Moreover, overreaction is related to risk taking in
a portfolio choice task thereby adversely aecting portfolio eciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our ex-
perimental design in detail. Especially, we extensively present the relation of our design
and the variables measured to existing research. Furthermore, we present a theoretical
framework. In Section 3 the results are shown. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design: Overview, Relation to Literature, The-
oretical Framework, and Details
2.1 Overview and Relation to Literature
When observing new information, agents should update their beliefs. Rational agents will
do so using Bayes rule. But irrational agents may overreact to the signals they observe.
Such agents, after observing positive news would become exaggeratedly optimistic, and
after bad news exaggeratedly pessimistic. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) oer one of the
rst experimental studies of this phenomenon.1
Overreaction can have signicant economic eects, especially in nancial markets where
information and signal processing are crucial. In this context, it can generate mispricing
and reduce investment performance. Odean (1998) analyzes a model where some investors
think their signal is more accurate than it really is. Consequently, they overreact to their
1Subjects were given information and asked to predict the future grades of students. The information they were given
could be of one of three possible types: i) the previous grades of the students, ii) a measure of their mental concentration, iii)
a measure of their sense of humor. While i) was a useful signal, participants should have realized that ii) was less relevant,
and iii) practically irrelevant. And yet, participants reacted almost as strongly to ii) and iii) as to i).
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signals, and market prices also overreact. Daniel et al. (2001) extend the CAPM to the case
of overcondent investors. Such investors form what they perceive to be mean-variance
ecient portfolios. But, to the extent that they overreact to signals, they fail to diversify
properly, and stocks are mispriced.
Several empirical studies based on stock market data are consistent with these views.
If prices initially overreact to information and then drift back towards rational pricing,
there will be mean reversion. This is what DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) found.
In their sample, past winners end up earning negative returns, while past losers earn
positive returns. While these early studies were based on stock prices only, more recent
studies endeavored to take into account information and forecasts. DeBondt and Thaler
(1990) study analysts' forecasts. Regressing actual earnings changes on forecasted earning
per shares they rejected the hypothesis that forecasts were unbiased expectations. Their
results suggest that forecasts are too extreme and then tend to be corrected. This is
consistent with overreaction.
Thomas and Zhang (2008) study market reactions to earnings announcements. They con-
sider pairs of stocks in the same industry for which earnings announcements occur sequen-
tially. Suppose earnings are announced rst for stock G, and then, some time later, for H.
Since G and H are in the same industry, the rst announcement is relevant for the second
stock. Consistently with this view, Thomas and Zhang (2008) nd that the price of stock
H reacts to the announcement for stock G. But, if investors were rational this reaction
should be on average correct. In contradiction with this hypothesis, Thomas and Zhang
(2008) nd that positive stock H reactions are followed by price declines when earnings
are announced for H. And negative reactions tend to be followed by price increases. This,
again, is consistent with overreaction.
The goal of the present paper is to complement these studies by oering direct evidence
on information signals, beliefs and nancial decisions. We take advantage of a controlled
experimental setting to directly test if agents' beliefs overreact to signals and whether
this aects performance. To achieve this, we designed a new nancial decision making
experiment in which we gave signals to participants, and then elicited their forecasts and
observed their investment decisions. The experiment was run at Mannheim University in
September 2007. 104 students participated and the experiment lasted around one hour.
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To strengthen the incentives of the students, we paid them according to the accuracy of
their forecasts and the performance of their nancial decisions. Payment per participant
ranged between 23.38 Euro and 49.74 Euro, with an average of 37.87 Euro.
The main features of the experimental design were the following. For 20 pairs of stocks,
participants were shown price paths. For each pair of stocks, participants were told that
the two stocks were in the same industry and that the return on each stock reected
common market shocks and common industry shocks, as well as idiosyncratic shocks. For
each pair of stocks (G and H), participants were shown the price path of stock G for the
whole year. For stock H, participants were shown the price path for the rst half of the
year only. Participants were asked to forecast the price of H at the end of the year. To do
so they could use the path of G as a signal.2
A strong positive return on G during the second half of the year is a positive signal
for H, signalling a positive return for that stock. Rational participants should take this
into account, while bearing in mind that this signal is imperfect, since each stock also
has an idiosyncratic component. But if agents are prone to overreaction, they will react
too optimistically after positive signals, and too pessimistically after negative signals. To
test if participants overreact we study whether their forecast error is correlated with the
signals they receive. The forecast error is dened as the dierence between the forecast
of the agent and the conditional expected value of the stock at the end of the year. For
each participant, we regressed across stocks this error onto the signal. While under rational
expectations the regression coecient which we will later on refer to as Overreaction-Beta
should be 0, for the majority of participants we obtained positive estimates.
As an alternative measure of overreaction, we took the ratio of forecasting error to the
innovation in the signal. If they overreact, agents will overestimate the nal price of H
after seeing good signals, and they will underestimate it after negative signals. Hence the
ratio will tend to be positive. In contrast, if agents are rational, the ratio will on average
2 This task is thus similar to that analyzed by Thomas and Zhang (2008): Both their paper and ours consider pairs
of stocks; and in both studies information on G is obtained before information on H, and can thus serve as a signal to
forecast the evolution of H. The dierence is that Thomas and Zhang (2008) run a eld experiment while we conduct a lab
experiment. The advantage of the former approach is that observed outcomes are unquestionably economically meaningful
while the advantage of the latter is that beliefs and information can be observed more directly. It is interesting that, in the
present case, the results of both approaches are consistent with one another.
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be zero. Thus, to measure the overreaction bias of the agent, we took the median of this
ratio (Median-Overreaction-Ratio), across the 20 stocks the agents had to forecast. We
nd that, on average, participants tend to overreact. We also found this second measure
of overreaction to be highly correlated with the rst one.
In addition to their forecast of the price at the end of the year, participants are asked
to provide an upper bound and a lower bound, such that there is only one chance out
of ten that the nal price is outside these bounds. Thus, we can estimate the degree
of overcondence, or miscalibration, of the participants. Basically, miscalibrated agents
estimate condence intervals which are too narrow. In line with the theoretical model of
Odean (1998), we nd that overcondence and overreaction are signicantly positively
correlated.
We also asked participants to form portfolios combining the stocks for which they were
asked to form predictions. Correlating these portfolio choices to overreaction, we can
test if this bias aects nancial decisions and performance. We nd that, when they
overreact more, agents allocate a greater (resp. lower) fraction of their wealth to stocks
with positive (resp. negative) signals. We also nd that such over- and under-weighting
reduces performance of the portfolios, measured by their Sharpe ratio.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
In our experiment, participants observe the realization of the price of a stock. They must
use it as a signal about the price of another stock in the same industry. Denote by ~s the
signal and by ~v the price to be forecasted. They are such that:
~s = ~v + ~e;
where ~v and ~e are independent. A rational forecast F (s) = E(~vjs) must be such that
the prediction error F   ~v is independent from the signal. Hence, for a cross section of
independent stocks j = 1; :::; N , we must have that, in the regression:
F (~sj)  ~vj =  + ~sj + ~zj; (1)
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the two coecients are not signicantly dierent from 0. In contrast, if the agent overre-
acts, he / she will put too much weight on the signals. As a result  will not be equal to
0.
To gain more insights on this point in a tractable framework, assume the random variables
are jointly normal. Thus,
E(~vjs) = E(~v) + (s  E(~s));
where:
 =
cov(~v; ~s)
var(~s)
=
cov(~v; ~v + ~e)
var(~v + ~e)
=
V ar(~v)
V ar(~v) + V ar(~e)
:
 measures the reaction of the agent to the innovation in the signal. An agent who over-
reacts will overestimate . His biased forecast will be:
E^(~vjs) = E(~v) + ^(s  E(~s));
with ^ > .
In this context, when observing the forecast F of an agent, we can infer if this agent is bi-
ased, and how much. In the experiment, as explained below, we know the data generating
process and can thus compute the rational forecast: E^(~vjs). We can then infer the mag-
nitude bias by subtracting the rational forecast from the observed one, and normalizing
this dierence by the innovation in the signal. Indeed:
F   E(~vjs)
s  E(~s) =
E^(~vjs)  E(~vjs)
s  E(~s) = ^   : (2)
If the agent is rational, this ratio is equal to 0, while if the agent is prone to the overreaction
bias, the ratio will be positive.
Odean (1998) and Daniel et al. (2001) model investment decisions when investors are
overcondent in the sense that they are miscalibrated, i.e., they overestimate the precision
of their information. In our simple specication, this can be modeled as underestimating
the variance of the noise term ~e in the signal ~s. Thus, while a rational agent correctly
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estimates the variance V ar(~e), a miscalibrated agent underestimates it and perceives the
variance to be V ar(~e), where  < 1. Hence, the miscalibrated agent will form conditional
expectations using a biased coecient to react to the signal:
^ =
V ar(~v)
V ar(~v) + V ar(~e)
> :
Thus, miscalibration generates overreaction to signals.
2.3 Simulated Price Paths
As explained below, we asked participants to process information inferred from stock
price paths. We had the choice between showing participants real stock price paths from
eld data and simulated price paths. We chose the latter for two reasons. First, this
enabled us to control the data generating process, make sure that the 20 tasks are indeed
independently and identically distributed, and compute rational expectations forecasts,
reactions to signals and condence intervals. Second, this made the task anonymous and
minimized the risk that participants would project into the task views from their personal
experience. In addition, we explicitly used the words stocks and stock markets to make
the task more realistic and understandable.3
To generate twenty pairs of price paths over one year, we drew for each trading day
i = 1; :::; 252 and each pair j = 1; :::; 20 three shocks: i;j (corresponding to the common
industry shock), Gi;j (corresponding to the idiosyncratic shock of stock G) and 
H
i;j (corre-
sponding to the idiosyncratic shock of stock H). All these daily shocks are i.i.d, normally
distributed with mean 0.025 and standard deviation 2.0. We then calculated the stock
price for trading day i by adding the industry and rm specic shocks onto the stock
price of the previous day.
3In pre-tests in which we used neutral framing subjects had problems with the task and advised us to use a stock related
framing. In addition, using a stock related environment has been utilized in the literature frequently (see e.g. Glaser et al.
(2007) and Biais and Weber (2009)).
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2.4 Questionnaires and Measurement
The questionnaire was lled out by 104 students, from two classes at the University of
Mannheim, in September 2007 (see an extract of the questionnaire in the appendix).
Participants were shown 20 pairs of stock price paths, generated as explained above. In
each pair, for one stock (G) they saw the path of daily stock prices for the whole year, while
for the other stock (H) they only saw the rst six months. Two examples of such graphs
are depicted in the appendix. For each pair of stocks, participants were told that the two
stocks were in the same industry and that the return on each stock reected common
market shocks and common industry shocks, as well as idiosyncratic shocks specic to
that stock. For each pair of stocks the subjects were asked to forecast the nal price of
stock H at the end of the year. In the notations we introduced above, the nal price of
stock H at the end of the year corresponds to ~v, while the signal ~s corresponds to the
return on stock G over the second half of the year.
To incentivize the participants we rewarded them as a function of the accuracy of their
forecast, as explained in excerpts of the questionnaire in the appendix. We were also
concerned that the participants would nd the task too repetitive. To avoid this we scaled
up each pair of stocks, by multiplying the initial value and all shocks for each pair by a
random number between 0 and 2. We also constructed each graph with great care in order
to avoid distorting eects. All graphs had the same size and look and varied only in the
scaling on the vertical axes. Since the scaling can inuence the risk perception of subjects
we standardized the scaling procedure using insights from Lawrence and O'Connor (1992
and 1993) and Glaser et al. (2007). The scaling on the vertical axes was chosen such
that the dierences between the highest and lowest stock price over the course of twelve
months ll approximately 40% of the vertical dimension of the graph. In addition, the
number of horizontal lines is standardized to be either three or four. Also, to control for
order eects we randomized the 10 questions and distributed six dierent versions of the
questionnaire.
We used the forecasts of the participants to measure their overreaction bias. We thus
constructed two measures of the bias for each participant.
 We refer to the rst measure as the Overreaction-Beta. Consider a given participant.
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In line with equation 1 we regressed, across the 20 stocks, the forecast error of the
participant onto the signal he / she observed. The regression coecient obtained
for this participant is referred to hereafter as his / her Overreaction-Beta.4 Rational
agents will have an Overreaction-Beta equal to 0. But agents who overreact will have
positive betas.5
 We refer to the second measure as the Median-Overreaction-Ratio. Again consider
a given participant. In line with Equation 2 we computed for this participant, for
each of the 20 stocks, the ratio of forecast error to the innovation in his / her signal
(Overreaction-Ratio). We then took the median across the 20 stocks and refer to the
aggregate score hereafter as theMedian-Overreaction-Ratio of this agent. For rational
agents Median-Overreaction-Ratio should be 0. Agents who overreact to signals will
have a positive Median-Overreaction-Ratio.6
Participants were also asked to provide an upper bound and a lower bound such that
there was only one chance out of ten that the nal price would be outside the bounds.7
One way to measure the miscalibration of the agent is to count the number of cases for
which the nal price was outside the condence interval given by the agent (see Biais
et al. (2005) or Glaser and Weber (2010)). The measure we use is slightly dierent.
It relies on the notion, well tted for investment contexts, that miscalibrated agents
tend to underestimate risk. For each stock, we infer from the condence interval given
by the agent the standard deviation it implies for returns. To do this, we use the two
point approximation method proposed by Keefer and Bodily (1983). And then we divide
this implied standard deviation by the conditional standard deviation of the returns and
standardize everything by multiplying it with  1 (see e.g. Glaser and Weber (2007a) and
Graham and Harvey (2005)). Finally, we take the average of this ratio across the 20 stocks
4As we multiplied each stock price with a random number between 0 and 2 to make the task less repetitive we divide
both forecast error and signal with this random number to run the regressions with i.i.d. variables. However, our results are
robust if we simply run the regressions using forecast error and signal without adjusting for the standardization parameter.
5Our results in the following sections are essentially the same if we use the true drawn realizations instead of relying on
the parametric assumptions. Using realizations we calculate the forecasting error simply as the dierence between forecast
and realization.
6We use median scores to control for outliers. However, our results remain fairly stable if we use the mean or the mode
instead.
7Note that this is a standard way to measure overcondence in the literature (see Graham and Harvey (2005), Glaser
et al. (2010)), and Biais and Weber (2009) and directly connects to the psychological literature.
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to generate our Overcondence-Person score. The larger this score, the more overcondent
the agent with extremely overcondent subjects having a score close to zero.
Glaser et al. (2010) and Moore and Healy (2008) have recently shown that dierent ways
of assessing overcondence that have implicitly been assumed to be equivalent, do not
necessarily reect the same unitary construct. Nosic and Weber (2009) go a step further
and show that there is domain or context specicity of overcondence. Thus, we measure
miscalibration in a closely related context to overreaction to account for these ndings.
Note however that due to the use of the Keefer-Bodily approach there are no confounding
eects and subjects with bad estimates do not necessarily need to be overcondent and
vice versa.
After having provided their forecasts for two stocks (Hj and Hj+1) subjects were asked
to allocate an amount of 10,000 Euro between these two stocks and a risk free asset
generating a return of 0%. These kinds of portfolio allocation tasks are pretty common
in the literature (see e.g. Kroll et al. (1988) and Weber and Milliman (1997)). Subjects
were explicitly told that the two risky assets were from dierent industries and hence not
correlated with each other. This portfolio allocation task was carried out for ten pairs
of stocks. Short sales and borrowing were not allowed. In this portfolio allocation task,
subjects were paid according to the returns of their constructed portfolios. More precisely,
we told them that we would randomly pick one of the portfolios and calculate the return
of this portfolio. The payment for this task being then equal to 15 Euro times one plus
the return on the portfolio.
Finally, we also asked subjects questions about how they perceived themselves (see ex-
cerpts of the questionnaire in the appendix). For example we asked how much they were
averse to risk, how competent they felt about statistics and how competent they felt in
nance. We asked them to answer on a scale ranging from 1 (very good / very risk averse)
to 5 (bad / less risk averse).
2.5 Participants
The data was collected on September 19, 2007. One week before the data collection we
announced within the lectures Decision Analysis and Behavioral Finance that we would
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perform an interesting experiment for which students could register.8 This registration
process was carried out to ensure that only participants with a minimum level of knowl-
edge of nancial markets would participate. The study was carried through in one large
auditorium and subjects were randomly assigned a seat when entering the auditorium.
In order to avoid cheating we distributed six versions of the questionnaire that diered
in the order of the questions and instructed subjects who they would not be paid if they
would try to collude with others.
By and large, 104 students participated in the paper and pencil experiment. 56 students
were enrolled in the Behavioral Finance class, 31 in the Decision Analysis class, and 15
students attended both classes while two students did not indicate the class they were
attending. It took subjects approximately 55 minutes to nish the questionnaire.9 The
average subject was 24 years old with 83% of the subjects aged between 21 and 26. We
nd an almost equal split between males and females for our Decision Analysis class and
a strong majority (76%) of males for the Behavioral Finance class. Overall, subjects in
our experiment were predominantly male 70%.
To obtain the Risk Aversion score we multiply subjects' willingness to take risks with  1.
The average subjective Risk Aversion score was  2:9 and subjects indicated a slightly
better knowledge in statistics (2.9) than in nance (3.1). Subjects attending both classes
indicated a slightly better self-assessed knowledge in statistics (2.5) and in nance (2.7).
The overall payment for all subjects was on average 37.87 Euro with payments ranging
from 23.38 Euro to 49.74 Euro. The heterogeneity of the overall payment structure can
be seen in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
8We chose to recruit subjects majoring in nance or decision analysis as these subjects are better trained and educated
and should be less prone to behavioral biases. Thus, any results should be harder to achieve in this population. Note however,
that we ran the experiment in the second week of the term so that subjects did not have any specic knowledge about
behavioral biases, yet. In addition, amongst others Glaser et al. (2010) show that a similar student population is not more
prone to behavioral biases in a nancial context than investment bankers and that it is worthwhile to analyze interesting
research questions in experiments with students.
9Interestingly, subjects in a pre-test without payments needed only approximately 35 minutes to nish the questionnaire.
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3 Empirical Analysis
Overall, we have three main hypotheses that we want to test with our experimental setup.
First, we argue that overreaction to new signals should be prevalent in our setting. Second,
overreaction should be related to psychological biases such as miscalibration. And third,
overreaction should have some real nancial consequences, i.e. we should nd a relation
between overreaction and portfolio risk as well as portfolio eciency. Our three main
blocks of hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed more thoroughly in the
respective subsections.
Insert Figure 2 here
3.1 The Level of Overreaction
The rst goal of this study is to detect the degree of misreaction for each subject in our
setting. Some studies analyzing the level of misreaction nd evidence for overreaction
whereas other studies nd that subjects exhibit the tendency to underreact to signals
(for an overview of the diverging results in the literature see Barberis et al. (1998) and
DeBondt (2000)). Both Grin and Tversky (1992) and Bloomeld et al. (2000) argue that
the weight of a signal, i.e. its statistical reliability, and the strength of a signal, i.e. its
magnitude, determine if subjects overreact or underreact. They reason that overreaction
should be prevalent if the signal is of high strength and low weight. In line with the
ndings by Thomas and Zhang (2008) who analyze a similar setting as ours empirically
we hypothesize that subjects tend on average to overreact to information about a related
stock as the signal in our setting is of relatively high strength and low weight. Observing
overreaction in our experimental setting is also consistent with Odean (1998) who argues
that subjects tend to overweight attention-grabbing, anecdotal and graphical information,
just the type of information we gave subjects.10
Both measures of overreaction are highly correlated with each other (Spearman Rho =
0:85). Figure 3 shows that, on average, subjects tend to overreact in our setting no matter
10Overreaction to the graphical signal might also be interpreted as underreaction to the verbal information that was
provided to subjects.
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if we measure overreaction as Median-Overreaction-Ratio or Overreaction-Beta. For both
measures, a large majority of subjects have a positive overreaction score and exhibit the
tendency to overreact to the signal, whereas only a few subjects underreact to the sig-
nal.11 The averageMedian-Overreaction-Ratio is 0.33. To assess the internal psychometric
consistency of this overreaction measure we compute its Cronbach alpha. The Cronbach
alpha is 0.8 and thus above the threshold of 0.7 that is often assumed to indicate accept-
able psychometric reliability (see Nunnally (1978)). The beta coecients in our regression
of forecast error onto signal are also mostly positive with an average Overreaction-Beta of
0.37. Taking a closer look at the coecients we nd 91 (2) signicantly positive (negative)
coecients and only 11 insignicant coecients. However, there seems to be substantial
variation in the degree of both Median-Overreaction-Ratio and Overreaction-Ratio with
the scores ranging from  0:67 to 0.76. In the following subsections, we want to analyze
whether these individual dierences in overreaction are systematically related with other
traits like overcondence and performance.
Insert Figure 3 here
3.2 Miscalibration Determining the Level of Overreaction
Before we can test whether more miscalibrated subjects overreact more strongly we have
to show that we have a substantial degree of overcondence in our experimental setting.
Hence, we calculate Overcondence for each stock using the two point approximation
method proposed by Keefer and Bodily (1983) and aggregate these scores for each sub-
ject to obtain Overcondence-Person.12 We nd substantial degrees of overcondence in
our setting with 76 subjects having an Overcondence-Person score above  1 and a me-
dian Overcondence-Person score of  0:71 roughly the same size DeBondt (1998) nds on
average in his analysis of Fox Valley investors. A Wilcoxon signed rank test indicates that
Overcondence-Person is signicantly larger than  1 suggesting a prevalence of overcon-
dence in our sample. Moreover, in line with Glaser et al. (2010) we also nd substantial
11We obtain very similar results if we aggregate Median-Overreaction-Ratio using the mean instead of the median.
Moreover, there are no substantial dierences if we run our analyses for questions with a positive and negative signal
separately.
12Testing the internal reliability of our overcondence score we nd a Cronbach alpha above 0.9.
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heterogeneity in the degree of overcondence in our sample as the Overcondence-Person
scores range from  2:2 for the most undercondent subjects to  0:11 for the most over-
condent ones.13
If the hypothesis that more overcondent subjects tend to overreact more strongly,
since they overweight the informativeness of the signal, holds (see e.g. Odean (1998)
and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001)) we should nd a signicantly positive relation between
Overcondence-Person and both of our overreaction measures. The relation should be pos-
itive since a higher Overcondence-Person score indicates higher levels of overcondence.
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between both overreaction measures and Overcondence-
Person. The Spearman rank correlation coecient between Overcondence-Person and
both overreaction measures is signicantly positive (Rho = 0.24 at a signicance level of
0.02 for Median-Overreaction-Ratio and Rho = 0.31 at a signicance level of less than
0.01 for Overreaction-Beta). Moreover, our results for this relationship are stable if we
control for demographic aspects and self-assessed knowledge or risk aversion. Thus, we
can conrm our hypothesis that more overcondent subjects overreact more strongly.
Insert Figure 4 here
3.3 Economic Signicance of Overreaction
Our ndings imply that subjects in our experiment overreact on average to signals and
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of overreaction. We also show a
positive relation between overcondence scores and overreaction indicating that more
overcondent subjects tend to overreact more strongly. Besides analyzing the degree of
overreaction and its relation to psychological biases we want to analyze the nancial
consequences of overreaction. Financial consequences of overreaction are in the literature
argued to be twofold. Fischer and Verrecchia (1999) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) argue
that subjects who overreact are - owing to overcondence - willing to take more risks in
their investments to exploit mispricings. Daniel et al. (2001) and Biais and Weber (2009)
13We also calculated for each person the number of questions for which the conditional expected value or the realized
value were between the stated upper and lower bounds. The correlation between these two new overcondence measures
and our measure calculated from implied standard deviations was above 0.9. In addition, results in the following sections
were essentially the same if we use these two other measures in the further calculations.
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show that subjects who overreact fail to diversify properly and hold less ecient portfolios
than subjects who do not overreact.
3.3.1 The Eect of Overreaction on Risk Taking
The main goal of this section is to analyze whether overreaction has an inuence on the
riskiness of portfolio decisions. As we did not allow subjects to take short positions in
any asset we should observe a twofold eect of overreaction on risk taking. After a good
signal overreacting subjects overweight the positive eects of the signal and invest more
heavily in the risky asset whereas after a bad signal they overweight the negative eects
of the signal and invest less heavily into the risky asset.14 Before we test this relationship
on a disaggregate level, we want to test if it also holds on an aggregate level. Therefore,
we correlate each subject's median portfolio risk which equals his / her median portfolio
volatility with both overreaction measures. However, since our hypothesis depends on the
sign of the signal we do this analysis separately for questions for which subjects received
positive (Median Risk+) and negative (Median Risk ) signals. Our hypothesis is that we
should nd a signicantly positive correlation between both constructs for good signals
and a signicantly negative correlation for bad signals.
Indeed, for portfolios with a positive signal the Spearman rank correlation of Median
Risk+ with Median-Overreaction-Ratio is 0.28 (p-value < 0:01) and the correlation with
Overreaction-Beta is 0.24 (p-value = 0:01). For portfolios with a negative signal the
Spearman rank correlation of Median Risk  with Median-Overreaction-Ratio is  0:21
(p-value = 0:03) and the correlation with Overreaction-Beta is  0:28 (p-value < 0:01).15
These relations are illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Insert Figure 5 here
Insert Figure 6 here
14If we would have allowed short sales more overreacting subjects should have taken larger short positions in stocks with
a negative signal than rational subjects.
15If we exclude subjects who decide not to invest into any of the risky assets, i.e. subjects whose portfolio risk is zero,
our results weaken as we lose a substantial number of observations. The correlation coecients are still negative, however,
not statistically signicant.
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An important issue in this context is if our results that a higher level of overreaction leads
subjects to take more risks after good signals and less risks after bad signals are driven by
other factors such as risk attitudes, gender, cultural background or overcondence. Risk
attitudes are the most prominent factor for which we want to control for in the following.
In risk-return frameworks commonly used in the nance literature (see e.g. Markowitz
(1952)) risk taking is governed by the risk and the return of an investment and by a
subject's risk attitude. Hence, the more risk averse a subject is the less risk he / she
will take. Various studies also argue that there is a gender eect in risk taking and that
females take substantially less risks than men in investment decisions (for an overview of
the literature see Eckel and Grossman (2008)).
Moreover, we want to analyze whether the cultural background of subjects could inuence
the risk taking behavior. In line with Weber and Hsee (1998) we argue that German
subjects who are from a more individualistic society should invest into less risky portfolios
than subjects from more collectivist societies.16 Furthermore, our data allows us to test
an assumption common in various models on overcondence (see e.g. Odean (1998) and
Daniel et al. (2001)) that more overcondent subjects are going to take more risks. In
addition to these factors, we will also control for the age of the subjects, the course they
are enrolled, their semester, and their self assessed knowledge in nance and in statistics.
Table 1 documents that both Median-Overreaction-Ratio and Overreaction-Beta are sig-
nicantly related to Median Risk+ and Median Risk  even if we control for additional
factors. Regressions in Columns 1 to 4 analyze portfolios for which subjects receive a
positive signal. For these portfolios we nd that an increase in the overreaction score by
one results in a 5.4 to 7.0 percentage points increase of Median Risk+ no matter if we
control for overcondence in the regression (Columns 2 and 4) or not. Since Median Risk+
is on average 0.22 this implies that the eect of both overreaction scores on portfolio risk
16Hsee and Weber (1999) and Weber and Hsee (1998) nd signicant cross-cultural dierences in risk taking. More
specically, they argue that subjects who live in a more collectivist society like China take substantially more risks than
subjects who live in a more individualistic society such as the USA. They term this the \cushion-hypothesis". The line of
reasoning is that subjects from less individualistic societies can rely on their family, i.e. have a cushion, to help them in case
of need. Since we collected data on the native-language of the subjects we are able to test this cultural hypothesis. As only
29 out of 104 subjects are not Germans we generate a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the subject is a native
speaker in German and 0 otherwise. The average individualism score according to Hofstede (1980) in the Non-German
group which consists of Russian, Chinese, Bulgarian, and French subjects is 36.7 and thus lower than the one for Germans
which is 67. Hence, Germans who are part of a more individualistic society should invest into less risky portfolios.
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is also of high economic signicance. Analyzing portfolios for which subjects receive a
negative signal (see regressions 5 and 6) we nd, consistent with the bivariate analyses, a
negative eect indicating that more overreacting subjects take substantially less risks in
these scenarios.
Moreover, for those questions for which subjects received a positive signal our control
variables indicate additional statistically signicant eects. First, Median Risk+ of males
is approximately 4 percentage points higher than the one of females. This result is in line
with ndings in Donkers et al. (2001) and Dohmen et al. (2005) who show that males
take substantially more risks in their nancial decisions. As hypothesized we also nd
a signicant negative eect of Risk Aversion on Median Risk+. Thus, less risk averse
subjects are investing into riskier portfolios. In addition, we also nd weak support for
cultural dierences (see Bontempo et al. (1997) and Weber and Hsee (1998)) as German
subjects hold less risky portfolios than Non-Germans. However, this eect is only weakly
signicant and vanishes if we control for overcondence. However, we cannot observe these
eects for Median Risk  in Columns 5 and 6. This dierence between questions for which
subjects received a positive or a negative signal could be analyzed more thoroughly in
future research. Furthermore, in line with Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Menkho et al.
(2006) we do not nd a direct eect of overcondence on portfolio risk but only an indirect
eect of overcondence on risk taking mediated by overreaction.
Insert Table 1 here
Now that we have found evidence for the hypothesized relationship between overreaction
and portfolio risk on the aggregate level, we turn to analyze the relationship on a disaggre-
gate level. Hence, we re-run the regressions from Table 1, but instead of using aggregate
scores for each subject we run our regressions for each question individually controlling
for question xed eects using dummies. As Overreaction-Beta is an aggregate measure
that is constant for each person over all questions we use in the following disaggregated
analyses only Overreaction-Ratio.17 To account for non-independent residuals within sub-
jects we cluster our observations over subjects. A rst look at the results in Table 2 reveals
17To get a single score for the two variables Overreaction-Ratio and Overcondence that are calculated for each stock,
i.e. twice for every portfolio allocation question, we simply take the mean of the variables for each portfolio allocation task.
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that the results are mainly consistent with our previous ndings in table 1. Higher levels
of overreaction result in riskier portfolio investments after positive signals and less risky
portfolio investments after negative signals. The eect of Overreaction-Ratio on Risk+
and Risk  is highly signicant regardless whether we control for overcondence or not.
In addition, we nd that after having observed a positive signal men hold substantially
more risky portfolios than women, and more risk averse subjects invest into less risky po-
sitions. We also nd support for the cultural hypothesis as the dummy variable German
is signicantly negative. Once again, the additional eects of Gender and German cannot
be observed for portfolios for which subjects received a negative signal.18
Insert Table 2 here
3.3.2 The Eect of Overreaction on Portfolio Eciency
A further consequence of overreaction that we want to test in the following is the rela-
tionship between overreaction and portfolio performance. Biais and Weber (2009) show in
their theoretical model that subjects who overreact, i.e. put too much weight on private
signals, will have a lower investment performance. Hence, in our experimental setting we
expect to observe that subjects will hold less ecient portfolios the more they overreact.
However, we found a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the level of overreaction with
some subjects even underreacting and thus putting not enough weight on the signal (see
Subsection 3.1). We argue that these underreacting subjects should also invest into less
ecient portfolios than rational subjects. This should result in a hump-shaped relation
between overreaction and portfolio eciency with rational subjects having the highest
eciency and eciency decreasing with higher levels of misreaction.
To analyze this relationship in more detail we rst have to dene the term eciency
of a portfolio. Our measure of portfolio eciency is the ex-ante Sharpe-Ratio for each
18Instead of clustering over subjects to control for non-independent residuals we also re-run the regressions using xed
and random eects models. We obtain essentially the same results using these models. However, both models have their
disadvantages. A Hausman test shows that the random eects model needs not to generate consistent estimates. Although,
the xed eects model generates consistent estimates its major disadvantage is that we cannot make a statement about the
eect of demographics, risk attitude, and knowledge on risk taking. Hence, we only make use of clustered ordinary least
squares regressions where we control for question specic eects.
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subject and each portfolio. To calculate the Sharpe-Ratio for a subject's portfolio we use
conditional expected returns and conditional expected standard deviation. Calculating the
Sharpe-Ratio makes only sense for stocks with a positive conditional expected return, and
thus we exclude in the following analyses all stocks with a negative conditional expected
return.
In addition, as we imposed short selling constraints on our subjects, i.e. we did not allow
them to short sell assets in order to invest more into the other assets, the capital market
line is no straight-line. Thus, we cannot make the general statement that a higher Sharpe-
Ratio implies a more ecient portfolio as it is possible that subjects who want to take
more risks can only do so by investing a relatively large amount into the riskier stock.
Due to the short selling constraint portfolios of these subjects have a lower Sharpe ratio
than portfolios of subjects that invest into the market portfolio. But we cannot infer that
they are less ecient as they oer the only possibility to take on more risk. However,
for subjects who invest in portfolios that are less risky than the market portfolio and for
subjects who invest into the risk free asset the risk constraint is not binding. Hence, in
our further analyses we omit 152 out of 728 portfolios that are to the right of the market
portfolio, i.e. that are riskier than the market portfolio, and for which subjects did not
invest into the risk free asset. Therefore, in the following analyses we only take portfolios
for which the short selling constraint is not binding.
To document the link between overreaction and portfolio eciency we calculate Spearman
rank correlation coecients between portfolio eciency and Median-Overreaction-Ratio
and Overreaction-Beta, respectively. However, as our hypothesis implies that stronger
misreaction (overreaction or underreaction) leads to less ecient portfolios we divide our
sample into two unbalanced parts. One part is composed of subjects that overreact and
the other, substantially smaller one of subjects who underreact. Calculating Spearman
rank correlation coecients for the two parts separately we nd a negative relation for
subjects who overreact with coecients of  0:33 for Median-Overreaction-Ratio (p-value
< 0:01) and  0:18 for Overreaction-Beta (p-value = 0:07) and a tentatively positive eect
for the six subjects who underreact. This relation is illustrated by the dashed (dotted)
lines in Figure 7 for subjects who overreact (underreact). The gure demonstrates that a
higher level of over/underreaction gives rise to less ecient portfolios.
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Insert Figure 7 here
While the above evidence indicates an eect of overreaction on portfolio eciency we want
to analyze whether this eect is stable if we control for additional variables. To analyze
this in more detail we run regressions with the median Sharpe ratio (see Table 3) and the
disaggregated Sharpe ratio (see Table 4) as dependent variables. Table 3 documents the
relation between portfolio eciency and both overreaction measures on an aggregate level
using additional controls for all observations for which subjects overreact. Consistent with
our previous ndings both overreaction measures have a signicantly negative coecient
indicating that higher levels of overreaction lead to lower levels of portfolio eciency.19
Insert Table 3 here
In addition, we re-run our regressions on a single question level instead of an aggregate
level and account for non-independent residuals within subjects by clustering over sub-
jects. Again, we only make use of Overreaction-Ratio as Overreaction-Beta is constant
for all subjects. Additionally, we control for question eects using dummy variables. The
results of these regressions are illustrated in Table 4. In Regressions 1 and 2 we only take
observations for which Overreaction-Ratio is greater than zero indicating overreaction
whereas in Regressions 3 and 4 we only take observations for which Overreaction-Ratio is
below zero indicating underreaction.
The regressions in Table 4 show the twofold eect of overreaction on portfolio eciency
on a single stock level. The more subjects misreact the lower is their portfolio eciency.
On the one hand, we nd highly signicantly negative overreaction coecients of approx-
imately  0:145 in the rst two regressions no matter if we control for overcondence or
not. On the other hand, our results in Regressions 3 and 4 indicate a highly negative ef-
fect of underreaction of approximately  0:3 on portfolio eciency. Consistent with Daniel
et al. (2001) and Biais and Weber (2009) we show that misreaction to signals, i.e. overre-
action or underreaction, is costly for investors and harms their performance. Minimizing
the level of misreaction can have a substantial eect on a subjects portfolio eciency as
19Regressing the median Sharpe ratio of subjects' portfolios on various control variables for underreacting subjects only is
not reasonable as the number of underreacting subjects is six and four, respectively, and thus too low to make any inferences
about the relationship between overreaction and portfolio eciency while controlling for additional variables.
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measured with the Sharpe-Ratio. Interestingly, the coecient of Overreaction-Ratio on
portfolio eciency is, in absolute terms, much larger if we analyze underreaction than if
we analyze overreaction. Future research might want to analyze this dierence in more
depth. Overall, our ndings are in line with the hypothesis of a hump-shaped relation be-
tween portfolio eciency and overreaction. Hence, the closer subjects are to the rational
benchmark the more ecient the portfolios are they are investing.20
Moreover, for Regressions 1 and 2 we nd a signicant eect for the course subjects are
enrolled. subjects who are enrolled in the Decision Analysis class which is a more general
topic course not only for students specializing in nance tend to invest into worse per-
forming portfolios than subjects who are enrolled in the Behavioral Finance class which
is part of the specialization in nance. A similar expertise eect is, for example, docu-
mented in Glaser et al. (2007). This is indicated by the positive coecients of Behavioral
Finance and Both. Mahani and Poteshman (2008) provide similar evidence by showing
that unsophisticated option market investors overreact to news on underlying stock and
consequently have a lower performance. Further control variables are not strongly signif-
icant, just as in the regressions on the aggregate level.
Insert Table 4 here
4 Conclusion
This paper experimentally analyzes the existence of overreaction, its relation to psycholog-
ical biases, and its nancial consequences. We introduce a new experimental design that
asks subjects to estimate the future price of an asset given the information on another,
related asset. This design allows us to measure the level of overreaction explicitly. We mea-
sure overreaction using two highly correlated measures: Our rst measure of overreaction
is simply the ratio of forecasting error to innovation in the signal (Overreaction-Ratio)
and our second measure of overreaction is the slope of a regression of error onto signal
(Overreaction-Beta). Overall, we nd evidence for strong overreaction in our data which
20As in section 3.3.2 we re-run the regressions using xed and random eects models. We obtain essentially the same
results using these models. However, a Hausman test shows that the random eects model needs not to generate consistent
estimates and thus we abstain from using it.
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is consistent with ndings in Thomas and Zhang (2008) who analyze a similar scenario
empirically.
Examining the relationship between overreaction and psychological biases we focus on
overcondence and more exactly on miscalibration, on average. We document a substan-
tial level of overcondence with the majority of subjects being overcondent. Relating
overcondence to overreaction we nd, as hypothesized, that more overcondent subjects
tend to overreact more heavily.
Moreover, we analyze the eect of overreaction on subjects' portfolio risk and on their
portfolio eciency. We show that after having received a positive signal overreacting
subjects take substantially more risks than rational subjects. In addition, our results
support ndings in the literature that show an eect of gender (see Eckel and Grossman
(2008)), risk aversion (see Barsky et al. (1997)), and culture (see Weber and Hsee (1998))
on risk taking. Also in line with our hypothesis we show that after receiving a negative
signal overreacting subjects invest into substantially less risky portfolios. This eect can
be attributed to the short selling constraint which was imposed by us to make the task
more realistic and less complex.
Relating portfolio eciency to overreaction we nd no linear relation but more of a hump-
shaped relation. This hump-shape implies that portfolio eciency is lower the more a
subject overreacts or underreacts. Analyzing the eect of overreaction and underreaction
separately we nd exactly this eect. Moreover, our results rely on decisions that have
substantial monetary eects. We pay subjects an hourly compensation that is on average
ve times as high as the hourly wage of undergraduate research assistants. To sum up:
Our experimental approach oers the advantage that we can explicitly measure the level
of overreaction and relate it to psychological biases and nancial consequences.
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Table 1: Median risk regressions
This table presents results on the relation between a subject's median portfolio risk (the median portfolio
risk for portfolios for which subjects received a positive signal is indicated by + and the median portfolio
risk for portfolios for which subjects received a negative signal is indicated by  ) and Age, Gender (the
dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject is male), Decision Analysis, Behavioral Finance, and Both
(the dummy variables take the value 1 if the subject attends the respective class), Semesters, German (the
dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject's mother language is German), Risk Aversion (the variable
is dened on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse to -5 = not risk averse at all), Statistical Knowledge and
Financial Knowledge (both variables are dened on a scale from 1 = very high knowledge to 5 = very low
knowledge), Median-Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-Beta, and Overcondence-Person using ordinary least
squares regressions with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. We report regression coecients and
p-values in parentheses. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** indicates signicance at the 5% level, and
*** indicates signicance at the 1% level.
Med. Risk+ Med. Risk+ Med. Risk+ Med. Risk+ Med. Risk  Med. Risk 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.830) (0.820) (0.568) (0.580) (0.791) (0.640)
Gender 0.040 0.040 0.042 0.042 -0.012 -0.013
(0.023)** (0.021)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.352) (0.308)
Behavioral Finance -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.009 0.023 0.022
(0.234) (0.339) (0.373) (0.490) (0.042)** (0.058)*
Both -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 0.017 0.019
(0.643) (0.854) (0.722) (0.933) (0.235) (0.199)
Semesters 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.696) (0.603) (0.516) (0.453) (0.821) (0.954)
German -0.026 -0.024 -0.027 -0.025 0.001 0.002
(0.086)* (0.116) (0.075)* (0.104) (0.924) (0.860)
Risk Aversion -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.010 -0.010
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.120) (0.126)
Statistical Knowledge -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 0.008 0.006
(0.242) (0.329) (0.229) (0.311) (0.306) (0.363)
Financial Knowledge 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004
(0.404) (0.460) (0.477) (0.528) (0.687) (0.583)
Median-Overreaction-Ratio 0.070 0.064 -0.037
(0.010)*** (0.020)** (0.089)*
Overreaction-Beta 0.061 0.054 -0.067
(0.030)** (0.059)* (0.002)***
Overcondence-Person 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.010
(0.433) (0.407) (0.659) (0.459)
Constant 0.152 0.157 0.155 0.161 -0.021 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.669) (0.937)
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.257 0.263 0.243 0.250 0.129 0.175
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Table 2: Risk regressions
This table presents results on the relation between the risk of a portfolio (the risk for portfolios for which
subjects received a positive signal is indicated by + and the risk for portfolios for which subjects received
a negative signal is indicated by  ) and Age, Gender (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject
is male), Decision Analysis, Behavioral Finance, and Both (the dummy variables take the value 1 if the
subject attends the respective class), Semesters, German (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject's
mother language is German), Risk Aversion (the variable is dened on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse
to -5 = not risk averse at all), Statistical Knowledge and Financial Knowledge (both variables are dened
on a scale from 1 = very high knowledge to 5 = very low knowledge), Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-
Beta, and Overcondence using clustered least squares regressions (number of clusters is equal to 101). We
report regression coecients and p-values in parentheses. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** indicates
signicance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signicance at the 1% level.
Risk+ Risk+ Risk  Risk 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.563) (0.551) (0.605) (0.619)
Gender 0.049 0.048 -0.007 -0.008
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.473) (0.423)
Behavioral Finance -0.013 -0.010 0.015 0.016
(0.334) (0.452) (0.088)* (0.060)*
Both -0.002 0.003 0.015 0.018
(0.918) (0.877) (0.244) (0.160)
Semesters 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.631) (0.524) (0.625) (0.757)
German -0.029 -0.027 -0.001 0.001
(0.040)** (0.054)* (0.919) (0.903)
Risk Aversion -0.021 -0.021 -0.008 -0.008
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.080)* (0.082)*
Statistical Knowledge -0.008 -0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.287) (0.416) (0.332) (0.248)
Financial Knowledge 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.703) (0.781) (0.275) (0.334)
Overreaction-Ratio 0.035 0.033 -0.052 -0.054
(0.008)*** (0.010)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Overcondence 0.015 0.009
(0.278) (0.206)
Constant 0.139 0.143 0.005 0.009
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.893) (0.819)
Observations 705 705 303 303
R-squared 0.472 0.474 0.214 0.220
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Table 3: Median Sharpe ratio regressions
This table presents results on the relation between a subject's median portfolio eciency measured with
the Sharpe ratio and Age, Gender (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject is male), Decision
Analysis, Behavioral Finance, and Both (the dummy variables take the value 1 if the subject attends the
respective class), Semesters, German (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject's mother language
is German), Risk Aversion (the variable is dened on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse to -5 = not risk
averse at all), Statistical Knowledge and Financial Knowledge (both variables are dened on a scale from
1 = very high knowledge to 5 = very low knowledge), Median-Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-Beta, and
Overcondence-Person using ordinary least squares regressions with heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors. Both regressions are only run for subjects for which the respective overreaction score was greater
than zero indicating overreaction. We report regression coecients and p-values in parentheses. * indicates
signicance at the 10% level, ** indicates signicance at the 5% level, and *** indicates signicance at the
1% level.
Median-SharpeOR>0 Median-SharpeOR>0
Age 0.007 -0.006
(0.729) (0.397)
Gender -0.049 -0.082
(0.555) (0.345)
Behavioral Finance 0.049 0.001
(0.540) (0.991)
Both 0.081 0.019
(0.441) (0.862)
Semesters 0.011 0.016
(0.559) (0.325)
German -0.052 -0.044
(0.578) (0.658)
Risk Aversion 0.060 0.059
(0.137) (0.170)
Statistical Knowledge -0.040 -0.027
(0.373) (0.566)
Financial Knowledge -0.007 -0.006
(0.877) (0.904)
Median-Overreaction-Ratio -0.772
(0.001)***
Overreaction-Beta -0.450
(0.034)**
Overcondence-Person 0.024 0.016
(0.743) (0.821)
Constant 1.717 1.885
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 95 97
R-squared 0.189 0.118
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Table 4: Sharpe ratio regressions
This table presents results on the relation between the eciency of a portfolio measured as the Sharpe-Ratio
and Age, Gender (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject is male), Decision Analysis, Behavioral
Finance, and Both (the dummy variables take the value 1 if the subject attends the respective class), Semesters,
German (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject's mother language is German), Risk Aversion
(the variable is dened on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse to -5 = not risk averse at all), Statistical
Knowledge and Financial Knowledge (both variables are dened on a scale from 1 = very high knowledge
to 5 = very low knowledge), Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-Beta, and Overcondence using clustered least
squares regressions (number of clusters is equal to 101). Regression 1 & 2 are run using only observations for
which the respective overreaction score indicates overreaction: we indicate this by SharpeOR>0. For regression
3 & 4 we use only observations for which we nd negative overreaction, i.e. underreaction and indicate this
with SharpeOR<0. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** indicates signicance at the 5% level, and ***
indicates signicance at the 1% level.
SharpeOR>0 SharpeOR>0 SharpeOR<0 SharpeOR<0
Age 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.435) (0.343) (0.506) (0.448)
Gender -0.067 -0.067 0.129 0.136
(0.055)* (0.057)* (0.122) (0.094)*
Behavioral Finance 0.090 0.082 0.015 0.005
(0.025)** (0.038)** (0.793) (0.922)
Both 0.113 0.093 0.023 0.008
(0.018)** (0.045)** (0.800) (0.939)
Semesters -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.014
(0.247) (0.174) (0.334) (0.275)
German 0.037 0.028 -0.109 -0.115
(0.358) (0.501) (0.165) (0.131)
Risk Aversion 0.032 0.030 -0.024 -0.023
(0.104) (0.112) (0.416) (0.442)
Statistical Knowledge -0.025 -0.031 0.053 0.048
(0.212) (0.114) (0.105) (0.151)
Financial Knowledge -0.021 -0.018 -0.048 -0.047
(0.248) (0.329) (0.095)* (0.102)
Overreaction-Ratio -0.145 -0.142 0.297 0.308
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
Overcondence -0.052 -0.041
(0.059)* (0.409)
Constant 1.994 1.963 1.982 1.980
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 421 421 137 137
R-squared 0.811 0.812 0.654 0.655
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Figure 2: Overview of hypotheses
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Figure 5: Relation overreaction and portfolio risk (questions with positive signal)
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5 Appendix
Part A: Stock Price Forecasts - Instructions
We are interested in the question how financial markets really work. Therefore, we need to understand 
how you form expectations about future stock prices. In part A you will see stock price charts, each with 
two stocks. 
The two stocks shown in each graph are from the same industry and hence positively correlated. More 
precisely, future stock price changes are random and depend upon a common industry-specific shock and 
a stock-specific shock. The magnitude of the two shocks is on average equal and the shocks have the 
same statistical distribution. In addition, we know that these distributions in the first 6 months are iden-
tical to the distributions in the following 6 months, i.e. the distributions remain constant. 
For one stock (Stock G-0) we are going to show you the stock price chart for all 12 months whereas for 
the other stock (Stock H-0) we are going to show you the stock price chart only for the first 6 months. 
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We kindly ask you to forecast the stock price of Stock H-0 in 6 months, i.e. at t = 12. The only informa-
tion given to you is the stock price performance of Stock H-0 for the first 6 months and the stock price 
performance of Stock G-0 for the whole observation period. In part A you are asked to make three state-
ments concerning the future stock price: a lower bound, a best guess, and an upper bound.
? The best guess should be equal to the value where you expect the price of Stock H-0 to be in 6 months 
(i.e. at time t = 12) 
? You should set the bounds such that only in 1 out of 10 questions the actually realized stock price is 
outside your provided bounds. Hence, you should provide an upper and a lower bound such that you 
are 90% sure that the realized value of Stock H-0 at time t = 12 falls between the two 
2
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Part A: Stock Price Forecasts – Payment Scheme
Your payment in part A depends only on the quality of your best guesses. I.e. the smaller the difference 
between your best guess and the actually realized stock price is, the higher is your payment going to be. 
To determine your payment exactly we calculate for each of the 20 exercises (10 questions each with 2 
exercises) in part A your so called error. This error is the absolute margin between your best guess and 
the actually realized stock price:  
  Error i = | Best Guess i – Actually Realied Price i |    i = 1, 2, …, 20 
Then we calculate your average error over all 20 exercises in part A as: 
  Average Error =   
20
Error  
20
1i
i?
?
Your final payment for part A is the maximum of 0 € and 50 € minus your average error and is calculated 
using the following formula: 
? ?ErrorAverage -  € 50;€ 0 Max  PaymentA ?
Thus, in a best case scenario your payment in part A can be up to 50 € and in the worst case your payment 
is going to be 0 €. 
Part B: Portfolio Allocation - Instructions
In every of the 10 portfolio allocation questions in part B we kindly ask you to invest at time t = 6 a given 
amount of 10,000 €. Your investment opportunities in every question include a risk free asset that gener-
ates a return of 0% and two risky stocks. The two stocks in part B are the same stocks for which you pro-
vided stock price estimates in part A of the respective question. 
You are asked to allocate the amount of 10,000 € – from your point of view – optimally between the risk 
free asset and the two stocks. However, you can only invest amounts greater or equal to zero into each 
of the three assets. I.e. you cannot sell one asset short and invest a higher amount of money into the re-
maining two assets. Moreover, you are only offered these three investment opportunities and hence you 
must divide the whole amount of 10,000 € between them. 
Part B: Portfolio Allocation - Payment Scheme
At the end of the study we are going to calculate realized returns for each stock for the time period t = 6 
to t = 12. Then we are going to pick 1 of the 10 questions randomly and are going to calculate the real-
ized return of your stated portfolio. 
Your final payment for part B is equal to: 
  Payment 
B
 = 15 € * (1 + Realized Portfolio Return) 
3
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Question 3.A: Stock Price Forecasts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3.B: Portfolio Allocation 
 
In the following situation we kindly ask you to divide 10,000 € at time t = 6 between the following three 
investment opportunities: Stock H-5, Stock H-6 and a risk free asset, that generates a return of 0 %. The 
two stocks are from different industries and hence they are not subject to the same industry-specific 
shock. 
 
  
 
Best guess for stock H-5 Upper bound for stock H-5 
€ € 
Lower bound for stock H-5 
€ 
Best guess for stock H-6 Upper bound for stock H-6 
€ € 
Lower bound for stock H-6 
€ 
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Amount invested in Stock H-6 
€ 
Amount invested in Stock H-5 
€ 
The three amounts should add up to 10,000 € 
Amount invested in risk free asset 
€ 
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Some questions about how you see yourself:
How do you rate your statistical knowledge? 
1       2            3    4       5 
very good bad
How do you rate your knowledge about stock markets and financial markets? 
1      2           3   4       5 
very good bad
In this questionnaire, we asked you to provide upper and lower bounds for 20 exercises related to stock 
price expectations (part A). For how many of these exercises do you think the final value is outside the 
range you gave? 
________ (Please give a number between 0 and 20)
In this questionnaire, we asked all subjects to provide upper and lower bounds for 20 exercises related to 
stock price expectations (part A). For how many of these exercises do you think the final value is outside 
the range provided by the average participant? 
________ (Please give a number between 0 and 20)
Some final questions about you:
Age: __________ 
Gender:        female    male 
Line of studies: ________________________________ 
Semester: ____________________ 
How would you classify your willingness to take risks in financial decisions? 
1      2           3   4       5 
Very low 
willingness 
Very high 
willingness 
5
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